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F a i r  T r a d e  ( f r o m  n o w  o n  a l s o  F T )  m a y  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  a s  a  g e n e r a l  p u r p o s e  
innovation which creates a new line of products. The main characteristic of such 
products is that of being a bundle of physical and “socially responsible” 
elements. The socially responsible content of FT goods consists of an original 
organisation of the product chain and, within it, of the relationship between 
primary producers, importers, certifiers and retailers. Such distinctive element 
is formally resumed by FT (IFAT)
2 rules. The latter documents how Fair Trade 
schemes aim to use consumption and trade in order to promote inclusion and 
capacity building of poor farmers in global product markets through a package 
of benefits which include anti-cyclical mark-ups on prices, producer friendly 
trade agreements (insurance against price fluctuations, advances on payments, 
 
                                                 
2 According to IFAT (the main federation gathering producers and Fair Trade organizations) 
such criteria are: i) Creating opportunities for economically disadvantaged producers; ii) 
Transparency and accountability; iii) Capacity building; iv) Promoting Fair Trade; v) Payment of 
a fair price; vi) Gender Equity; vii) Working conditions (healthy working environment for 
producers. The participation of children, if any, does not adversely affect their well-being, 
security, educational requirements and need for play and conforms to the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child as well as the law and norms in the local context); viii) The environment; ix) 
Trade Relations (Fair Trade Organizations trade with concern for the social, economic and 
environmental well-being of marginalized small producers and do not maximise profit at their 
expense. They maintain long-term relationships based on solidarity, trust and mutual respect 
that contribute to the promotion and growth of Fair Trade. Whenever possible, producers are 
assisted with access to pre-harvest or pre-production advance payment).    3
etc.), long-term relationships, credit facilities and business angel consultancy to 
build producers’ capacity.  
In recent times Fair Trade net sales have grown considerably, leading to a 
mainstreaming of this market phenomenon from its original niche dimension.
3 
The reason for this success is the increasing willingness to pay of “concerned” 
consumers for the social and environmental characteristics of the products.
4 A 
main problem in the “Fair Trade economy” is that the value creating intangible, 
which represents its main innovation, cannot be tasted. This is because the 
social and environmental content of FT products is not an experience good and 
the asymmetric information problem between sellers and buyers may be only 
partially solved with reputational mechanisms and the intermediation of 
certifiers and labelling organisations.
5  
                                                 
3 Between 2006 and 2007, total FT sales registered a 127% increase by volume and 72% by 
estimated retail value. Growth in Europe has averaged 50 % per year in the last 6 years. Even 
though Fair Trade has been originated by not for profit importers (ATOs), this impressive 
growth has induced traditional corporations to step in. Coop supermarkets in the UK and Italy 
created their own Fair Trade product lines since the ‘90es, Nestlè launched its first fair-trade 
product in 2005. In 2008 Tesco and Sainsbury announced their decision to sell 100% Fair Trade 
bananas leading the UK market share for this product to 25 percent (for a discussion on   
competition between fair trade dedicated retailers and supermarkets see also Kohler, 2007). On 
September the 3
rd 2008 Ebay launched a dedicated platform (WorldOfGood.com) for fair trade 
e-commerce calculating that the U.S. market for such goods was $209 billion in 2005, and 
foreacasting that it will rise to $420 billion in 2010.  
4 A recent inquiry on a representative sample of Italian consumers finds that around 30% of 
them are willing to buy FT products even if they have to pay up to 10% more with respect to 
non FT equivalent ones (Transfair, 2005). The share rises to around 70% when the price is the 
same. Similar results are found in other inquiries in the UK (Bird and Hughes, 1997), Belgium 
(De Pelsmacker, Driesen and Rayp, 2003) and Germany 
(www.fairtrade.net/sites/aboutflo/aboutflo).  
5 Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International (FLO) is the umbrella organisation of 20 
labelling Initatives in Europe as well as Canada, the United States, Japan, Australia and New 
Zealand. By the end of 2007, there were 632 Fair Trade certified producer organizations in 58 
producing countries, representing 1.5  million farmers and workers. With their families and   4
Given the above mentioned framework, it is easy to understand the importance 
of methodologically sound impact studies. They can be useful to importers to 
evaluate, beyond the myth, whether all FT criteria are effectively applied and to 
understand which factors are more beneficial in terms of producers’ inclusion 
and capacity building. They can be useful to consumers to obtain more 
information on the socially responsible content of the products and provide 
sounder grounds to their willingness to pay.  
The empirical literature of FT studies is growing and presents, togheter with 
many valuable case studies (Bacon, 2005; Pariente, 2000; Castro, 2001a and 
b; Nelson and Galvez, 2000; Ronchi, 2002 and 2006), some econometric 
analyses which evaluate the impact of affiliation against the benchmark of a 
control group of non FT producers living in the same areas (Ruben, 2009). 
Among these papers Ronchi (2006) finds on a panel of 157 mill data that FT 
helped affiliated Costa Rican coffee producers to increase their market power. 
The author concludes that FT benefits are of the vertical integration type and 
that “the decision to support fair trade requires other information about its 
costs and benefits”. Becchetti and Costantino (2008) find that FT affiliates in 
Kenya enjoy superior product and trade channel diversification, price stability 
and insurance services. These effects generate social benefits in terms of 
reduced child mortality, health and social capital (but no significant human 
capital effects). Becchetti et al. (2008) observe in Peru that years of affiliation 
                                                                                                                                                 
dependents, FLO estimates that 7.5 million people directly benefit from Fairtrade. For further 
details see http://www.fairtrade.net/labelling_initiatives.html.   5
significantly increase productivity and self esteem. Consistently with the luxury 
axiom (Basu, 1998 and 1999), effects on child schooling materialise only after 
a given threshold of PPP income is overcome. These papers show that FT may 
create positive or negative externalities in terms of changes of non affiliated 
producers’ wellbeing and improved bargaining power of affiliated producers with 
local intermediaries.  
One of the limits of FT intervention, if not aimed at improving the capacity of 
affiliated farmers to face market competition, is that it may create a form of 
dependence from the (volatile) benevolence of socially responsible consumers.
6 
This is the reason why a more accurate empirical analysis (actually missing) on 
the impact of FT affiliation on capacity building  is of foremost importance. The 
goal of our paper is to provide a contribution in this direction by analysing how 
some specific characteristics of affiliation (anticipated payments, enhanced 
interactions between producers and training courses) may affect productivity 
and transition to the optimal scale of production.    
The paper is divided as follows. In the second and third section we briefly 
sketch the story of the cooperative of producers (Apicoop) affiliated to Fair 
Trade and the dynamics of honey market, in the fourth section we present 
descriptive statistics for the full sample and for the subsamples of affiliated and 
                                                 
6 The theoretical debate about pros and cons of Fair Trade revolves around three main points: 
the discussion on whether the price premium paid to producers is or is not a distortion of 
market clearing prices, the comparison of the relative efficiency/effectiveness of fair trade 
versus donations or subsidies, the externalities of Fair Trade introduction on other non affiliated 
local farmers (for details see Becchetti and Costantino, 2008; Maseland and De Vaal, 2002; 
Moore, 2004; Hayes, 2004  and Leclair, 2002).   6
non-affiliated producers. In the fifth section we focus on the effects of affiliation 
on training courses, cooperation among producers and advances on payments. 
In the sixth section we present and comment econometric results on 
productivity. In the seventh section we deal with the selection bias problem. 
The final section concludes. 
 
2. History of Apicoop 
During the military dictatorship of the ‘70s was very difficult and the Church 
founded several organizations with the objective of helping the economic 
development of the Dioceses. These institutions were usually financed with 
foreign donations. For this reason, in 1980 Monsignor José Manuel Santos 
founded Fundesval (FUNdación DESarrollo VALdivia) with capitals provided by 
Miserior, a German institution founded in 1958 as agency "against hunger and 
disease in the world"
7.  
Fundesval managed six different development projects, one of which was 
related to honey.
8 The honey-project pursued three objectives: (i) creating an 
additional source of income to farmers; (ii) improving the feeding of the 
population through the consumption of the honey produced; (iii) favoring the 
                                                 
7 www.miserior.de . 
8Chile has a diverse variety of flowers of native species, herbaceous plants and trees that grow 
only in the central and southern areas of the country. One of these trees is ulmo, which stands 
out due to its pure white flowers, with extraordinary melliferous qualities. These flowers, so 
abundant as to make the tree appear covered in snow, are pollinated by bees that use the 
nectar to produce honey of ulmo, a speciality of northern Patagonia and of the Los Lagos 
region.  
    7
creation of a cooperative society (comité campesino). The first two targets were 
reached within five years, while the third was realized only in 1998, when the 
Diocese accepted the request of honey producers associated to the honey-
program to become independent. In fact, only the honey program was making 
profits. The profits of the honey-program were used to cover the losses of the 
others: on average, in the ‘80s around 28000-30000 USD were diverted every 
year. Finally, in 1998 the honey producers took over the honey-program and 
founded Apicoop, while the five remaining programs were closed. 
In order to take over Fundesval, honey producers had to pay the Church a sum 
of 180,000 USD in current terms. Furthermore, funds were needed to renovate 
the main office, open the credit lines to farmers and buy new working tools. 
The honey producers relied on the profits generated by their program in the 
period 1998-1999, on a 50,000 USD loan provided by CTM Altromercato (an 
Italian NGO which imports and sells Fair Trade products in Italy) and on two 
donations of the Province of Bolzano (Northern Italy) which covered 50% of the 
renovation costs of the ceiling of the office and of the honey collection room.  
The decade 1998-2007 has been a long road towards financial independence 
with the production of honey enormously increasing and Apicoop becoming the 
fourth Chilean exporter of honey and the first Chilean producer of Fair Trade 
honey. At present, the cooperative is made up of 127 beekeeping producers 
partners (123 individuals and 4 cooperatives), distributed mostly in the Los 
Lagos region. Apicoop members do not simply benefit from commercialization   8
of honey through the cooperative, but receive also free technical assistance, lab 
tests on the quality of honey and interest-free credit support.  
 
3. Evolution of prices and volumes in the Chilean export market of 
honey  
The honey market is subject to significant fluctuations in quantities and prices. 
As a consequence of significant investments by farmers in Southern Chile, the 
production and export of honey has increased enormously over the last years. 
Fluctuations in export quantities and prices are due to sudden shocks to the 
national production and to the international demand and supply.  
A notewhorthy episode in this period is the sudden rise in the period 2002-2004 
due to an antibiotic scandal which led the EU to ban the Chinese and 
Argentinean honey for two years. Once, in 2005, imports from China and 
Argentina were allowed again, the price fell by more than 40%. The current 
positive price trend is due to the rising demand not only from developed 
nations but also from developing ones. China, the biggest honey producer in 
the world, has increased its per-capita consumption of honey thanks to the 
rising purchasing power of its citizens, thereby contributing to the positive 
trend. In such a complex international scenario, FT long-term contracts which 
stabilize the revenues can be a good insurance for farmers. 
 
4. Dataset and summary statistics   9
Evidence presented in the following sections comes from honey producers, 
randomly sampled from two sets of treatment and control groups (respectively 
farmers affiliated and not affiliated to Apicoop) and interviewed in January and 
February 2008. The questionnaire consisted of a set of standard questions on 
socio-demographic and economic variables, plus other questions related to the 
honey production.
9 The majority of honey producers are men, middle aged, 
with primary or secondary education, married with children. Almost everybody 
owns the house he lives in and some land (on average 10 hectares, ranging 
from 0 to 160). One third of affiliated farmers have no more than 3 affiliation 
years, while the top third of them more than 10. 
The main activity is the production of honey (60% of the sample), but also 
agriculture and other activities (usually employment in other firms) are 
important. Worked hours  are around 42 per week and approximately half of 
them are devoted to the production of honey. Average annual total income is 
five million Pesos (around 6,600 Euros or about 18 dollars per day).
10 The 
lowest values of total income and income from honey are equal to zero for 
young people living with their family who are just starting the honey business.
11  
                                                 
9 Table 1 describes the variables considered while summary statistics for the whole sample are 
omitted for reasons of space and available upon request. 
10 This standard of living is far higher than what found in other Fair Trade impact studies. 
Becchetti and Costantino (2008) calculate a standard of living of around 3 dollars in PPP for 
Meru Herbs famers in Kenya. In Peru, Becchetti et al. (2008) find for the control samples of two 
producer groups in Juliaca and Chulucanas a standard of living of, respectively, around 0.6 and 
6 dollars, against around 2 and 7 dollars for the corresponding samples of affiliated producers. 
11 During the first years of activity all the productive effort is devoted to multiply the number of 
bee families and honey is not produced.   10
The simple unweighted average share of honey sold to the FT affiliated 
cooperative (Apicoop) is equal to 50 percent, the retail share is 31 percent, 
while shares of output sold to local or international intermediaries are lower 
than 10 percent. The (wholesale) price of honey sold to the FT affiliated 
cooperative is obviously lower than the retail price, but surprisingly is also 
lower than the price paid by local, traditional and international intermediaries. 
On the other hand, the cooperative provides a set of valuable services: free 
transport of honey, zero interest advance payments, lab tests on honey 
chemical properties, training courses, guaranted purchase of a given amount of 
product which reduces producers’ search costs of buyers, etc.  
The sample average production of honey per year is 3,200 kilos, but the 
dispersion is high, ranging from 0 (3 new producers with no past yield records 
met during the interviews)
12 to 60,000, with a standard deviation of 6,100. The 
average physical productivity (production per weekly hour of work devoted to 
honey) is 180 kilos. Around 20 percent of producers get advanced payments, 
whose average is 25 percent of the value of the honey production. Only one 
individual out of 38 paid interests on the advances (at 20 percent rate), while 
the others did not pay them since the cash in advance was provided by Apicoop 
which does not charge anything for this service.  
One quarter of the sample lives in towns and the remaining three quarters in 
the countryside. The majority of individuals live in the area of Santa Barbara, 
                                                 
12 These producers are obviously eliminated from the productivity estimates which follow.   11
Rancagua, Paillaco and Mahiue, the remaining 45% being spread over several 
villages.  
Honey producers can be classified into three groups: people affiliated to FT 
(which we call Flo producers), people not affiliated to FT (No Flo producers) and 
people only indirectly affiliated to FT through another cooperative (Half Flo 
producers). The first group is made of producers directly associated to the 
cooperative. The second is made of producers not associated to the cooperative 
who can, however, sell honey to the cooperative which, in turn, sells it locally. 
Finally, people indirectly associated through other producer organizations may 
sell to Apicoop and get the FT price and premium, but not the other services. 
They are in between the Flo and the No Flo groups. The composition of our 
sample is such that 46 % of respondents are directly associated to Apicoop, 
12% indirectly through other organizations and 42% are independent.  
Table 2 shows means and confidence intervals of selected variables for the 
subgroups of FT affiliated (Flo) and independent producers (No Flo). We do not 
include the intermediate group (Half Flo) to focus on the difference between the 
two extremes of full and no affiliation, but we will control for their 
characteristics in the econometric estimates which follow. Double starred values 
(**) indicate non overlapping confidence intervals, that is, 95 percent 
significance of the difference in means between control and treatment groups.
13 
Although most socio-demographic characteristics are similar, there are 
                                                 
13 We run the Wilcoxon nonparametric rank test as a robustness check and obtain the same 
results in terms of significance. Evidence is omitted and available upon request.     12
important differences between the two subgroups, especially when looking at 
the production of honey and at other economic variables.  
The three main differences in performance between treatment and control 
producers concern total yearly income from honey (2,998 against 1,252 
thousand of pesos), the quantity of honey produced (4,403 against 1,991 kilos) 
and productivity measured as income from honey per hour worked (248 against 
110 pesos).  This implies that affiliated producers are both larger in size and 
more productive.  One of the puzzles which we will try to disentangle is 
therefore whether FT affiliation has additional benefits in terms of productivity, 
net of the effect of size, and whether producers progressed in size and 
economies of scale, also thanks to FT affiliation. 
Since inclusion in one of the two (treatment and control) samples is non 
random but depends on a voluntary choice of producers, we must control 
whether differences between treated and non treated depend on implicit or 
explicit selection bias. On the implicit side, producers’ characteristics which 
affected the affiliation decision may also affect performance, irrespectively of 
the affiliation effect. On the explicit side, it is reasonable to expect that the 
cooperative selects the most promising candidates to meet the increasingly 
high quality standards required by international competition. In 2006 this has 
been made explicit in the statute of Apicoop which now establishes a set of 
requisites to obtain membership. The most important of them states that the 
applicant must have at least 3 years of proven production of honey and 25   13
beehives.  Note however that, exactly for this record of increasing entry 
standards, we should expect the performance gain to be decreasing in 
affiliation years (since older producers belong to vintages with less stringent 
quality requirements). An opposite result would, on the contrary, suggest that 
this kind of selection bias cannot solely explain the observed differences. 
From Table 2 we can see that productivity, production and income from honey 
are significantly higher for Apicoop members. Our qualitative information from 
cooperative members tells us that the training courses provided by the 
association have surely played a role in increasing productivity, particularly 
under the aspect of reducing bees’ diseases and increasing their honey 
production. Econometric estimates will try to verify these declarations from a 
quantitative point of view. On the contrary, the price and income per kilo sold 
are lower for people associated to Apicoop since they produce higher amounts 
and sell more wholesale (FT chain) rather than retail (local market).  
Non affiliated producers sell only 7.5 percent of their production to Apicoop, 57 
percent retail and the rest to local or international companies, while people 
associated to Apicoop sell 82 percent to the cooperative, 14 percent to retail 
and the remaining to other companies.
14  
The local retail price is lower for Apicoop’s members, thus there are no positive 
externalities of FT affiliation on their bargaining power with local buyers.
15 
                                                 
14 Apicoop’s statute imposes to their members to sell at least 80 percent of their 
production to them. 
15 Evidence of such externality is provided in Becchetti et al. (2008) for Peruvian FT affiliated in 
the area of Juliaca (Titicaca lake).   14
Another surprising element is that the average salary paid by FT entrepreneurs 
to the temporary workers is lower than that paid by independent ones. This is a 
common problem with FLO and other FT organizations, whose rules and 
statutes (see footnote 3) establish minimum prices and premiums for FT 
members but do not deal with the relationship between producers and their 
seasonal workers. 
 
5. Training courses, advances of payments and Marshallian 
externalities: the difference between affliated and non affiliated 
producers 
In this section we focus our attention on three qualifying differences between 
affiliated and non affiliated farmers: advances on payments, attendance of 
training courses and cooperation with local farmers. Looking at Table 2, only 2 
percent of control sample farmers enjoy advances on payments against around 
36 percent of Apicoop farmers. 44 percent of non affiliated farmers declare they 
have not participated to training courses in the last three years, while this is 
the case for only 22 percent of Apicoop farmers. 87 percent of Apicoop farmers 
declare to cooperate with other producers in the area, while this occurs for 71 
of non affiliated farmers. 95 percent confidence intervals show that these 
differences in means are significant. Descriptive evidence on these three points 
is confirmed by econometric analysis (see Table 3) where they are regressed on   15
a series of controls.
16 The specifications include ender, schooling years, family 
status dummies, number of family members, parents’ education, house 
ownership, land size, total number of hours worked, geographical and type of 
productive organization dummies.   
Our estimates show that affiliation to FLO certificated cooperatives is 
significantly and negatively correlated with the probability of not having 
participated to training courses in the last three years (such probability falls by 
around 32 percent and by 27 percent for directly and indirectly affiliated 
producers, respectively)
17  (Table 3, column 1).
18 The same direct affiliation is 
positive and significant in regressions on the determinants of advances for 
payment (marginal effect of 50 percent) and declaration to cooperate with 
other local workers (marginal effect of 12 percent) (Table 3, columns 2 and 3). 
Consider here that indirect affiliation has slightly higher effects in magnitude, 
thereby showing that these two last benefits are already attainable with it.
19 
Cooperation is also positively and (weakly) significantly related to the number 
of hours worked (.2 percent the marginal effect), while advances on payments 
with schooling years. These associations are reasonable since hard working and 
committed producers will be more likely, and have more opportunities, to 
                                                 
16 All estimates which follow are with White (1980) heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. 
17 Marginal effect are not displayed in the estimates and calculated, following standad formulas, 
on the basis of estimated coefficients.  
18 We introduce the two categories with separate regressors since we want to test the different 
effect of FT on affiliated and indirectly affiliated producers selling to Apicoop at FT conditions. 
19 The first finding is consistent with the availability of all price benefits, also to indirectly 
affiliated producers selling to Apicoop for export in the FT channel.   16
interact with other producers, while more educated producers should possess 
higher skills which produce superior creditworthiness.  
The effect of FT affiliation has not just a once-for-all effect but also a 
progressive one. When in our previous specification we replace the affiliation 
dummy variable with two alternative measures of participation to the FT 
channel (the length of the relationship with the cooperative and the production 
share sold to the Apicoop cooperative) we find that years of relationship with 
Apicoop have positive and significant effects on advances on payments and 
cooperation with local workers (1 and 1.7 percent are the marginal effects of 
one additional affiliation year on each of the two variables respectively) (Table 
3, columns 4-6). Note as well that years of indirect affiliation (sales to Apicoop 
without membership) have no significant effects confirming that part of the 
benefits accrue only to fully affiliated producers.  
Our findings are confirmed when we proxy closeness to the cooperative with 
the share of producers’ output sold to Apicoop. The latter has negative 
(positive) and significant effects on the probability of having never received 
training courses (obtaining advances on payments) (-0.2 and 0.3 percent are, 
respectively, the two effects for a one percent increase in the share of the 
product sold to the cooperative).  
The variable measuring local interactions among producers may be seen as a 
proxy of Marshallian externalities if we consider the well known Marshall’s   17
definition.
20 If we take into account standard criteria typically adopted in the 
literature in order to define industrial districts
21 we may observe that they apply 
much more to the treatment than to the control sample. Considering the low 
density and the geographical distance between producers in the rural areas in 
which we run our survey, cooperative membership is one of the few 
opportunities to bridge such distance and promote interactions among 
producers. 
 
6. Productivity and FT affiliation 
We measure productivity as income from honey production per hour worked 
and regress it on measures of FT affiliation and various controls (Table 4, 
columns 1-4). As it will be shown below, the first four specifications are model 
free, while the two which follow test a specific theoretical assumption. The 
estimate in column 4 shows that affiliation to FT is associated with an increase 
                                                 
20 “Industry’s secrets are ceasing to be secrets: they are, as it where, in the air and children are 
unwittingly learning many of them. Work well done is immediately recognised and people 
discuss right away the merits of inventions and improvements made to machines, processes 
and the general organisation of industry: if somebody comes up with a new idea, it is at once 
taken over by others and combined with their own home-made suggestions; it this becomes a 
source of other new ideas” (Marshall, 1920). 
21 The main characteristics of industrial districts are generally considered to be:  i) the 
concurring presence of cooperative and competitive features which reduce transaction costs, ii) 
the high horizontal and vertical mobility of workers (Becattini, 1990), iii) the abundance of exit 
and voice mechanisms generated by the intensity of productive relationships and interactions 
between firms and workers within the district (Brusco, 1982; Dei Ottati, 2000), iv) the local 
abundance of historically accumulated intangible production factors, from (managerial culture, 
know how, tacit capabilities) (Maillat, 1998), v) the presence of “social networks” (based on 
kinship, family and localness) which facilitate the flow of knowledge within district borders 
(Becattini, 1990). The presence of these socially homogeneous communities is expected to 
foster the intensity of inter-firm cooperation especially under the form of joint programs for the 
provision of collective goods (Paniccia, 1998) and of creation of local institutions (Lazerson and 
Lorenzoni, 1999), thereby increasing social capital, which is currently recognised as one of the 
crucial factors of growth and conditional convergence (Knack and Keefer, 1997).    18
of 83,186 pesos of honey income per hour worked. It is a remarkable difference 
if we consider that average honey income per hour worked is 141,302 pesos.  
Other significant factors are schooling years (9,645 pesos per additional year of 
education), land size (1,429 pesos per hectar), type of productive organization 
and (weakly) marital status.
22 The link between our productivity variable and 
affiliation is confirmed if, instead of the two dummy variables, we use a unique 
synthetic indicator represented by the share of production sold to Apicoop 
(Table 4, column 1). A one percent higher share of sales to Apicoop is 
associated to a gain in farmer’s honey income per hour worked of 707 pesos. 
The importance of the role of the three above described factors characterizing 
affiliation (advances on payment, cooperation and training courses) is 
confirmed when we instrument the affiliation dummy first with years of 
affiliation (Table 4, column 2) and, after it, with the three factors (Table 4, 
column 3). The instrumented variable is significant in the second but not in the 
first case. The Hansen's J statistic test of overidentifying restrictions does not 
reject the joint null hypothesis that the instruments are valid instruments, i.e., 
uncorrelated with the error term. We may wonder whether the affiliation effect 
is due to the superior capacity of affiliated farmers to reap economies of scale. 
We therefore make an explicit standard theoretical assumption on the inverse 
U-shape of the average product function, which implies a U-shaped average 
                                                 
22 The significance of the affiliation variable persists if we limit the estimate to producers hiring 
seasonal workers and therefore include in the estimate cost of seasonal labour as an additional 
control. Estimates are omitted for reasons of space and available upon request.   19
cost function with increasing (decreasing) returns of scale in the downward 
(upward) side of the curve. As a consequence, we estimate the following 
specification: 
∑ + + =
j
j jX Y Y H Y γ β α
2 /      with   H0:α>0, β<0.   
Consider as well that, if γj>0, this implies that the j-th factor (i.e. FT affiliation) 
produces a significant perpendicular upward shift of the location of the affected 
producer from the sample average product curve. Estimates in columns 5 and 6 
show that the inverse U-shape assumption is not rejected (both levels and 
squares of total output are significant and with the expected sign). However, 
beyond size, years of affiliation (marginal effect of 3,039 pesos per year) and 
schooling years have an independent positive effect on productivity (even 
though they are now weakly significant). This implies that FT affiliation years 
remain significant once we control for the productive scale. It is also interesting 
to see that the affiliation effect materializes only for fully affiliated producers 
(or the “FT age half flo” variable, measuring affiliation years of producers 
selling to Apicoop at FT price conditions without being full cooperative 
members, is not significant). 
Two issues to be discussed in our results are omitted variable bias and 
measurement error. As it is well known (Deaton, 1997) in development studies 
the first problem generally relates to the quality of land
23 and the second to 
                                                 
23 In this perspective, economies of scale may be a spurious effect driven by a downward bias 
of the size coefficient when the omitted quality variable is negatively related with size.   20
measuring income. Since we are looking at honey production, quality of land is 
not so important, while quality of productive techniques is much more so. The 
latter are not exogenous since they are affected by training courses and 
interaction among local producers which, in turn, have been shown to be 
affected by FT affiliation years. With regard to the measurement error problem, 
the main candidate in our case is the dependent variable. This creates fewer 
problems with respect to a measurement error in the regressors and should not 
alter the sense of our estimates.   
 
7. Controlling for selection bias: three approaches 
An obvious problem in our model is the lack of dynamics which makes hard to 
distinguish between the impact of FT affiliation and a selection bias effect. Does 
affiliation improve productivity and economies of scale, or are more productive 
and larger farmers more likely to enter the cooperative? We try to provide a 
qualitative and two quantitative answers to this question. On a qualitative point 
of view consider that the competitive race in export markets is becoming 
progressively tighter and international standards of health and product quality 
regulation increasingly more severe across years. It is therefore highly 
implausible that Apicoop has affiliated progressively smaller and less efficient 
producers across years.   
Just to give an example of a “vintage” factor (invariant from the first affiliation 
year to now) which should be correlated with productive skills at the moment of   21
entry, we find that average school years of producers with less than 3 years of 
affiliation in 2007 are 10.44, against 8.37 of those between 6 and 9 years and 
7.64 of those above 12 years. This descriptive finding seems consistent with 
the progressively more severe (land size based) selection criteria described in 
section 4, assuming the likely correlation between size and producer’s 
education in the entry year.  
Hence, the significant effect on a given performance variable of any additional 
year of affiliation supports the hypothesis of a contribution from the 
organization and acts against a (vintage driven) selection bias which should 
operate in the opposite direction by reducing the positive, or even determining 
a negative, link between years of affiliation and performance.  
A first quantitative answer to the selection bias problem is provided by 
estimating a treatment regression model in which the effect of FT affiliation is 
controlled for the selection characteristics of affiliates. The treatment regression 
model shown in Table 5 includes the following two equations
24: 
Honeyproductivityi = α0 + α1 Age + α2 Education + α3  Hectars + α4 HoursTotal 
+ α5 YearspreApicoop + α6 House + α7 Flo + vi         [1.1] 
Floi = β0 + β1 Age + β2 Male + β3 Married + β4 PeopleInHouse + β5 Education 
mother+ β6 Education father + Σk δk Prodstructurek + zi               [1.2] 
                                                 
24 In the two equation system (v) and (z) are bivariate normal random variables with zero 








ρ σ . The likelihood function for the joint estimation of [1.1] and 
[1.2] is provided by Maddala (1983) and Greene (2003).   22
where Prodstructure are k dummies capturing the organizational form of the 
producer (family, firm, committee,
25 lone producer) and Regiondummies 
capture regional location of the producer.  
Note that, to meet the requirement of using selection variables not affecting 
our performance indicator, in both estimates we use as regressors factors 
which revealed themselves not correlated with the dependent variable in single 
equation estimates. Some of these variables are however significant in the 
selection equation (gender and firm organization). The hypothesis of 
uncorrelation of residuals of the two equations is not rejected. The affiliation 
variable remains significant both in the first and in a second specification in 
which we control for economies of scale by adding the level and square of 
honey production. 
As a further robustness check we finally propose a second approach for 
evaluating the effect of FT, net of the selection problem (Tables 6.1 and 6.2). 
As it is well known, in the impossibility of having time series and applying more 
sophisticated approaches,
26 propensity score matching (PSM)
27 may be a 
reasonable approximation of it. By matching couples of treatment and control 
producers which are closest in terms of selected characteristics, we may 
assume with the PSM approach that the average treatment effect of the treated 
                                                 
25 The committee is an informal organization of a small group of individual producers who 
coordinate their sales and purchases of output in order to obtain higher bargaining power with 
local intermediaries. 
26 Fair Trade existed in the area before our survey. Therefore it was impossible to perform a 
randomized experiment on the issue at stake in this paper. 
27 For details on this approach see Dehejia and Wahba (2002), Heckman et al. (1996, 1998), 
Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997, 1998). See Friedlander, Greenberg, and Robins (1997)   23
captures the specific contribution of FT affiliation on the selected performance 
variable. Following what is standard in the literature when choosing regressors 
to build the propensity score, we ensure that the vector of variables on which 
the matching is conditioned is independent from individual assignement to the 
treatment sample.  
We also check that the second crucial condition (distribution of the outcome 
conditioned on the set of independent variables from the treatment) is met. 
Consider that our dependent variable is full affiliation and productive scale is 
introduced among regressors. In this way we make our test more severe since 
indirectly affiliated producers are in the control sample and the average 
treatment effect is evaluated at the same level of productive scale.
28 Obtained 
findings confirm the difference between affiliated and non affiliated farmers 
since average treatments of the treated (ATT or differences in means between 
treatment and control samples) are significant when looking at share of product 
sold to Apicoop, productivity (income from honey per hours worked), advances 
on payments and cooperation with local farmers (Tables 6.1 and 6.2).
29 
 
                                                 
28 Exclusion of indirectly affiliated producers from the test and elimination of the productive 
scale variables (level and squares of physical production) make differences between treatment 
and control sample more significant. Results are omitted for reasons of space and available 
upon request. 
29 What the reader might question at this point is why not all producers choose affiliation given 
its benefits. The answer should be clear from our results. Less risk averse producers might 
prefer to take the risk of fluctuating honey prices to the implicit insurance provided by FT. 
Furthermore, affiliation to a cooperative implies the commitment to sell large part of their 
production to Apicoop and a series of social obligations that producers with a strong sense of 
independence may not like.  Last but not least, producers not always have full awareness of the 
potential economic benefits of affiliation. 
   24
8. Conclusions 
The recent  literature on impact studies of FT affiliation is important in two 
respects: i) it gives to consumers of FT products a test on the validity of the 
promise to promote inclusion and wellbeing of marginalized producers, thereby 
reducing the asymmetric information gap between consumers and sellers; ii) it 
gives relevant insights to importers, labelers and retailers on the application of 
criteria, emphasizing their strengths and weaknesses and stimulating their 
discussion and implementation. 
Our analysis on Chilean honey producers in a period of high market prices 
highlights that, beyond the fair price myth, non price conditions are much more 
important and capable of “Creating opportunities for economically 
disadvantaged producers” as the first point of IFAT criteria announces. More 
specifically, the case of Apicoop producers illustrates that FT affiliation, in spite 
of an insignificant price differential in times of rising market prices, has helped 
local farmers to improve their productive skills across years. In this process 
more favourable financial conditions (advances on payments at 0% interest 
rate), internalisation of Marshallian externalities via interactions among local 
producers and training courses are the distinguishing features with respect to a 
control sample of non affiliated producers which seem to have paid an 
important role.  On the overall, our findings show that affiliation years 
significantly contribute to increase producers’ productivity shifting farmers 
above the inverse U-shaped average product curve in the sample.    25
Among the limits which Fair Trade has to tackle we signal the need for more 
transparency on full and half membership, the attention to wages of seasonal 
employees of producers (which is not in the criteria) and the necessity to 
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Table 1. Variables definition 
 Variable Description   Variable Description 
Male  DV equal to 1 if the respondent is male 
Sale to international 
intermediaries  Share of honey sold to international intermediaries 
Age  Age in years  Price Apicoop  Price paid by Apicoop 
Education  Years of school attendance Price  retail  Retail  price 
Education mother  Education of the mother in years  Price local intermediaries  Price paid by local intermediaries 
Education father  Education of the father in years 
Price traditional 
intermediaries  Price paid by traditional intermediaries 
Married  DV equal to 1 if the respondent is married 
Price international 
intermediaries  Price paid by international intermediaries 
Single  DV equal to 1 if the respondent is single  Price per kilo  Price of honey per kilo 
Living together 
DV equal to 1 if the respondent lives with 
the partner  Honey production  Total production of honey in kilos 
Divorced  DV equal to 1 if the respondent is divorced  Productivity per hour  Value of honey prodution per hour worked 
Separated 
DV equal to 1 if the respondent is 
separated  Advance payment 
DV equal to 1 if the respondent received advance 
payments 
Widowed  DV equal to 1 if the respondent is widowed  Percentage advance  
Percentage of the value of the honey production 
received in advance 
Children  Number of children  Interests on advance  Interest rate applied to advance payments 
People in house  Number of people living in the household  Training courses 
DV equal to 1 if the respondent attended training 
courses in the last 3 years 
Hectars  Property of land in hectars  Loan  DV equal to 1 if the respondent received a loan last year 
House 
DV equal to 1 if the respondent owns the 
house Savings 
DV equal to 1 if the respondent was able to save some 
money last year 
Honey  DV if honey is the main economic activity  Credit restriction 
DV equal to 1 if the respondent faced credit restrictions 
last year 
Other bees 
DV if other products from bees are the 
main economic activity  Cooperation 
DV equal to 1 if the producer declares to cooperate with 
other producers in the area 
Agriculture 
DV if agriculture is the main economic 
activity Wage  permanent  worker 
Average hourly wage of  workers employed over the 
whole year 
Breeding 
DV if breeding is the main economic 
activity Wage  temporary  worker  Average hourly wage of seasonal workers  
Other activity 
DV if the main economic activity is not one 
of those mentioned above  Happiness  Self declared happiness level (from 1 to 10) 
Hours total 
Number of hours devoted to working 
activities in general  Family satisfaction 
Self declared satisfaction with economic conditions of 
the family (from 1 to 10) 
Hours honey 
Number of hours devoted to the production 
of honey  Town  DV equal to 1 if the respondent lives in town 
Hours agriculture  Number of hours devoted to agriculture  Santa Barbara  DV equal to 1 if the respondent lives in Santa Barbara 
Hours breeding  Number of hours devoted to breeding  Paillaco  DV equal to 1 if the respondent lives in Paillaco 
Hours other 
Number of hours devoted to other 
economic activities  Rancagua  DV equal to 1 if the respondent lives in Rancagua 
Income necessary  Income considered necessary to live well  Mahiue  DV equal to 1 if the respondent lives in Mahiue 
Income total  Total income earned last year  Lone producer  DV equal to 1 if the respondent produces honey alone 
Income honey  Income from honey last year  Family  
DV equal to 1 if the respondent produces honey with 
the family 
Income bees  Income from other bees' products last year  Company 
DV equal to 1 if the respondent created a company to 
produce honey  
Income agriculture  Income from agriculture last year  Committee 
DV equal to 1 if the respondent belongs to a honey 
committee 
Income breeding  Income from breeding last year  Years pre Apicoop 
Years of affiliation to a cooperative before the birth of 
Apicoop 
Income other  Income from other activities last year  Flo 
DV equal to 1 if the respondent is directly associated to 
FT cooperatives 
Other sources 
DV equal to 1 if the respondent has other 




DV equal to 1 if the respondent is not affiliated to 
Apicoop but sells part of its production to Apicoop for 
the FT export channel enjoying the FT price benefits 




DV equal to 1 if the respondent is neither a Flo nor an 
Half Flo producer (not affiliated to Apicoop and not 
selling to Apicoop for the FT export channel) 
Sale retail  Share of honey sold to retail 
 
FT age flo  Number of affiliation years of Apicoop members 
Sale local intermediaries  Share of honey sold to local intermediaries 
 
FT age half flo 
 
Number of years of trade relationships of non affiliated 
members selling to Apicoop for the FT export channel 
Sale traditional 
intermediaries 
Share of honey sold to traditional 
intermediaries 
    29
Table 2. Confidence intervals of selected variables for treatment (Flo certified producers) and control samples  
                                
   No Flo    Flo 
                    
Variable    Obs  Mean  [95% Conf.  Interval]    Obs  Mean  [95% Conf.  Interval] 
                    
Male   98  0.78  0.69  0.86    108  0.89  0.83  0.95 
Age   98  48.29  45.62  50.95    108  50.60  48.42  52.78 
Education   98  10.35 9.49  11.20    107 9.46  8.69 10.23 
Children   97 2.47  2.10  2.85    106  2.66  2.28  3.05 
Hectars   98  11.83  6.28  17.37    107  8.26  4.44  12.08 
House   98  0.88  0.81  0.94    108  0.91  0.85  0.96 
Main activity                     
Honey   98  0.49**  0.39  0.59    108  0.69**  0.60  0.77 
Other bees    98  0.03  0.00  0.07    108  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Agriculture   98  0.19**  0.11  0.27    108  0.06**  0.02  0.11 
Breeding     98  0.06  0.01  0.11    108  0.07  0.02  0.12 
Other activity    98  0.23  0.15  0.32    108  0.18  0.10  0.25 
Hours worked                     
Hoours total    97  40.79  37.10  44.49    107  42.40  39.13  45.68 
Hours honey    98  14.89  12.07  17.71    108  20.32  17.62  23.03 
Hours agriculture    98  9.16  6.30  12.03    108  5.90  3.66  8.14 
Hours breeding    98  3.42  1.18  5.66    108  4.55  2.52  6.57 
Hours other    97  10.62  6.86  14.38    108  9.92  6.67  13.16 
Income and productivity                
Income necessary    98  5,177,143 4,263,280  6,091,006   107  4,308,785 3,771,018 4,846,552 
Income total    95  4,399,368 2,218,092  6,580,645   108  5,787,667 3,266,378 8,308,955 
Income honey   94 1,251,649**  860,207  1,643,091    107  2,998,411**  1,997,739  3,999,084 
Other souces    95  0.69  0.60  0.79    102  0.54  0.44  0.64 
Honey production    95  1,991**  1,208  2,774    103  4,403**  2,867  5,940 
Productivity per hour    94  110**  81  140    103  248**  168  328 
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Table 2. Confidence intervals of selected variables for treatment (flo certified producers) and control 
samples (follows) 
                                   
   No Flo    Flo   
                    
Variable    Obs  Mean  [95% Conf.  Interval]    Obs  Mean  [95% Conf.  Interval]   
                      
Price, sales and financial conditions                       
Sale Apicoop     98  7.50**  2.59  12.41    108  81.61**  77.10  86.12   
Sale retail     98  56.87**  47.51  66.23    108  14.38**  10.32  18.44   
Sale local intermediaries    98  11.42**  5.40  17.44    108  0.69**  -0.10  1.49   
Sale traditional intermediaries    98  18.17**  10.73  25.62    108  0.83**  -0.08  1.75   
Sale international intermediaries    98  1.76**  -0.70  4.21    108  0.28**  -0.27  0.83   
Price Apicoop    10  754  720  788    101  764  753  774   
Price retail sales    67  1,663**  1,565  1,761    70  1,461**  1,368  1,554   
Price local intermediaries     20  818  730  905    3  1,533  -64  3,130   
Price traditional intermediaries    14  792  730  854    3  1,133  374  1,892   
Price international intermediaries    2  915  -1,436  3,266    1  1,500  .  .   
Loans     98  0.70  0.61  0.80     105  0.80  0.72  0.88   
Savings    97  0.55 0.45 0.65    108  0.57  0.48 0.67   
Wage permanent    2  850  -3,597  5,297    10  822  575  1,069   
Wage temporary    36  1,012**  906  1,117    45  843**  789  897   
Cooperative services                        
Never attended training courses    98  0.438**  0.338  .5387.    86  .244**  .151  .336   
Cooperation   98  0.714**  0.623  0.805    87  .873**  .802  .944   
Advance payment    94  0.02**  -0.01  0.05    107  0.36**  0.26  0.45   
Percent advance    1  10**  .  .    35  23.20**  16.93  29.47   
Interests on advance    1  20**  .  .    32  0.09**  -0.10  0.28   
                      
 
**: the difference in mean among the two groups is significant at 5% level. Producers only indirectly affliated to Apicoop (Half Flo) are ruled out from the sample in order to focus 
on differences between full and no affiliation.   31
Table 3. Training courses, cooperation and advances on 
payments: the role of FT affiliation 
Dependent 
Variable  N.  Tr.  courses Cooperation Advances No  Tr.  Courses Cooperation Advances 
            
Age 0.015566  0.004486  0.039435  0.01243  0.034333  0.002867 
 (0.82)  (0.23)  (1.52)  (0.70)  (1.36)  (0.14) 
Male 0.854694  -0.25427  -0.33717  0.557199  -0.1327  -0.56757 
 (1.50)  (-0.40)  (-0.47)  (1.09)  (-0.19)  (-0.83) 
Education -0.1037  0.022965  0.253103  -0.08525  0.221807  0.049678 
 (-1.74)  (0.35)  (2.50)  (-1.57)  (2.51)  (0.72) 
People in house  0.018855  -0.20758  -0.00631  -0.0222  0.032703  -0.20375 
 (0.14)  (-1.64)  (-0.05)  (-0.20)  (0.20)  (-1.64) 
Years pre Apicoop  0.049054  -0.09651  0.039625  -0.07556     
 (1.44)  (-1.75)  (1.08)  (-1.41)     
Hectars 0.005297  -0.00318  0.018158  0.00728  0.007854  -0.00714 
 (0.74)  (-0.41)  (1.81)  (1.14)  (0.92)  (-0.96) 
Hours total  -0.00912  0.022013  0.040061  -0.00554  0.036133  0.015346 
 (-0.87)  (1.73)  (2.44)  (-0.53)  (2.20)  (1.08) 
House 0.022207  -0.35726  -0.02672  -0.08627  0.046734  -0.26502 
 (0.06)  (-1.76)  (-0.11)  (-0.28)  (0.18)  (-1.23) 
Committee -0.96635  -0.21155  0.934869      
 (-0.74)  (-0.15)  (0.64)       
Family -1.99068  -0.50196  -2.05575  -1.36815  0.578803   
 (-2.78)  (-0.39)  (-2.07)  (-1.65)  (0.59)   
Lone producer  -1.42958  -0.73647  -1.67453  -0.77788  -0.07944  0.570377 
 (-1.97)  (-0.57)  (-1.65)  (-0.95)  (-0.15)  (0.58) 
Married 0.474099  0.74159  0.715672  0.387452  0.409287  1.120544 
 (1.03)  (1.60)  (1.35)  (0.89)  (0.84)  (2.22) 
Education mother  -0.15072  0.015359  -0.00968  -0.13556  -0.02766  0.01443 
 (-1.98)  (0.18)  (-0.11)  (-1.94)  (-0.31)  (0.17) 
Education father  0.081725  -0.01924  -0.11846  0.056983  -0.066  -0.00149 
 (1.17)  (-0.24)  (-1.55)  (0.94)  (-0.94)  (-0.02) 
Flo -1.9286  1.041347  5.367252       
 (-4.17)  (2.11)  (5.24)       
Half flo  -3.89362  2.347372  5.110247       
 (-3.50)  (1.80)  (4.39)       
Company -1.51959  2.638293        
 (-0.99)  (2.93)         
FT age flo        -0.04997  0.10202  0.17395 
       (-0.99)  (2.55)  (1.99) 
FT age half flo        -0.09561  -0.02623  0.686834 
       (-0.27)  (-0.17)  (1.57) 
Sale Apicoop        -0.01279  0.027142  -0.0036 
       (-2.28)  (3.68)  (-0.51) 
Constant 1.632754  1.72648  -10.1698  1.303637  -9.55867  0.417228 
 (0.90)  (0.88)  (-3.61)  (0.79)  (-3.72)  (0.22) 
                    
N. of obs.  206  188  196  200  195  182 
Wald χ2   χ (20)   χ (18)   χ (19)  χ (21)  χ (20)  χ (19) 
Prob> χ2 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Pseudo R2  0.28  0.17  0.4  0.21  0.35  0.19 
Legend: No training courses: DV equal to 1 if the producer attended training courses in the last three years; Cooperation: DV equal to 1 if the 
producer declares to cooperate with other producers in the area; Advances: DV equal to 1 if the producers received advanced payments on the 
product sold last year. For the legend of the other variables see Table 1. All regressions use DVs for the location and robust standard errors. 
Variables dropped for multicollinearity: Valdivia and Yearspreapicoop column 2. Variables dropped since they predict failure (dep. var=0) 
perfectly: Committee and Valdivia (column 3); Valdivia (column 4); Committee and Valdivia (column 5); Yearspreapicoop and Valdivia (column 
5).   32
Table 4. FT affiliation and  productivity  
Methodology OLS  IV
1 IV
2  OLS  OLS   OLS  
Age  1461.68  1430.049 1749.772 1412.735 1262.617 1129.963 
  (1.20) (1.17) (1.44) (1.16) (1.16) (1.06) 
Male  29366.53 32409.79 29083.76 29004.14 9989.349 13533.15 
  (0.69) (0.81) (0.71) (0.69) (0.24) (0.33) 
Education  9841.432 9727.202  10516.9  9645.027 7168.604 7051.898 
  (2.44) (2.36) (2.58) (2.32) (1.70) (1.82) 
People  in  house  21212.95 17661.57 18482.59 16383.14 15888.28  16494 
  (1.73) (1.55) (1.58) (1.31) (1.34) (1.41) 
Years  pre  Apicoop  479.9462 -418.222 -877.652 -659.778 -123.802   
  (0.17)  (-0.12) (-0.26) (-0.22) (-0.04)   
Hectars  1392.406 1406.562 1434.656 1429.959 1558.551 1526.899 
  (1.88) (1.97) (2.01) (2.06) (2.16) (2.07) 
Hours  total  -1278.8  -1091.59 -1144.96 -1077.23 -1189.69 -1215.72 
  (-1.21) (-1.08) (-1.10) (-1.05) (-1.20) (-1.17) 
House  -7271.37 -6153.53 -4004.99 -6032.88 3751.059 4438.612 
  (-0.85) (-0.71) (-0.47) (-0.69)  (0.52)  (0.57) 
Company  178068  182037.1  181836.1     
  (2.27) (2.30) (2.39)       
Committee      -180958  42.98725  7557.346 
      (-2.32)  (0.00)  (0.12) 
Family  26773.31 33588.98 28574.35  -148362  8152.503 14491.53 
  (0.69) (0.77) (0.64)  (-1.87)  (0.14) (0.24) 
Lone  producer  -11754.3 -7377.43 -8539.08  -188880 -16830.5 -12418.2 
  (-0.35) (-0.20) (-0.23) (-2.47) (-0.30) (-0.23) 
Married  38823.37 46030.58 42445.18 48098.75 32344.73 31000.45 
  (1.48) (1.76) (1.61) (1.81) (1.20) (1.16) 
Sale  Apicoop  707.2168       
  ( 2 . 0 7 )        
Flo    73320.94 92071.26 83186.04 50589.85   
    (1.63) (2.08) (2.65) (1.72)   
Half Flo    15758.02  -1374.85  21872.81     
   (0.32)  (-0.04)  (0.55)     
Honey  production       11.66654  12.51163 
       (2.76)  (3.02) 
[Honey production]
2      -6.51E-06  -6.97E-06 
       (-2.78)  (-3.04) 
FT  age  Flo        3039.482 
        ( 1 . 8 3 )  
F T   a g e   h a l f   F l o        - 3 0 8 7 . 2 8  
        ( - 0 . 4 0 )  
Constant  -157930 -153029 -185688  29074.59  -119713 -110535 
  (-1.51) (-1.39) (-1.71)  (0.25)  (-0.98) (-0.87) 
N  211 213 209 213 209 209 
F    F(18,194) F(18,190) F(18,193) F(18,193) F(18,188) F(18,188) 
Prob>  F  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hansen's J statistic*    
7.302  Χ
2 (3)  
P-val =   0.16287      
Pseudo R
2  0.38 0.39 0.38 0.38 0.43 0.43 
Legend: the dependent variable is productivity measured as value of honey production per hour worked. For the 
legend of the other variables see Table 1. All regressions use DVs for the location and robust standard errors.  
1: Instruments for Flo: FTageflo;  
2: Instruments for Flo: FTageflo, Cooperation, Advance Payment, No training courses.  
Robust t-stat in parentheses. * Hansen's J statistic test of overidentifying restrictions.  The joint null hypothesis is 
that the instruments are valid instruments, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term, and that the  excluded 
instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation.     33
 
 
 Table 5. Treatment regression model  
 
MAIN EQUATION  
(dependent variable: Productivity per hour) 
 
TREATMENT EQUATION (dependent 
variable: Flo) 
 
 (1)  (2)    (1)  (2) 
Age 3642.398  3154.087  Male  0.62947  0.60253 
 (2.01)  (1.93)    (2.11)  (2.01) 
Education 12486.05  4993.997  Married  0.000852  -0.02002 
 (2.22)  (0.96)    (0.002)  (-0.09) 
Hectars 1866.273  2518.979  Peopleinhouse  0.126561  0.112921 
 (1.94)  (2.91)    (2.23)  (2.01) 
Hours total  1764.776  419.7689 
Education 
mother -0.0447  -0.04585 
 (1.44)  (0.38)    (-1.28)  (-1.31) 
Year pre Apicoop  -2732.66  845.4519  Education father  0.01  0.006944 
 (-0.73)  (0.25)    (0.3)  (0.21) 
House -16829.9  6473.995  Committee  -6.24014  -12.1316 
 (-0.78)  (0.33)    (0.02)  (0.03) 
Flo 209624.4  124489.8  Family  0.086591  0.226867 
 (2.49)  (1.91)    (0.16)  (0.43) 
Honey production    34.17662  Single  -0.10485  0.045886 
   (5.9)   (-0.2)  (0.09) 
[Honey production]
2   -0.00047      
   (-3.7)       
Constant -279262  -268420  Constant  -1.04967  -1.06971 
 (-1.78)  (-1.9)    (-1.64)  (-1.65) 
          
N. of obs.    184      182 
Wald χ2   20.30      67.51 
Prob> χ2   (0.00)      (0.00) 
LR test of indep. 
 eqns. (ρ* = 0)   0.86(.352)      0.56(.522) 
          
*ρ: correlation coefficient of the residuals of the two equations 
Variable legend: see Table 1 
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Table 6.1 Differences among affiliated and non affiliated 
farmers (Propensity Score Matching) 
 
              
Variable  n.treat n.contr  ATT*  T-stat 
              
Honey per hour worked  87 119  1.02E+05  2.111 
      
Cooperation with local producers   87 119  0.167  2.58 
      
Comparative standard of living   87 119  0.438  1.436 
      
Professional self-esteem  87 119  0.381  1.503 
      
Advances on payments   87 119  0.242  3.309 
      
Share sold to Apicoop    87 119  55.71  11.245 
              
 
Note: ATT is the average treatment of the treated. Regressors in the ATT estimate: age, education, 
hectars, people in house, family, company, married, honey production and honey production squared. The 
balancing property is satisfied. Standard errors with bootstrapping and 50 replications.  
 
Table 6.2 Propensity score estimate 
(Dependent variable: Flo) 
 
Regressor Coeff.    T-stat 
    
Age -0.00195  -0.23 
House -0.00465  -0.04 
Male 0.499989  2.05 
Company 0.029337  0.03 
Family owned  0.364339  0.54 
Single 0.185419  0.27 
Married -0.26474  -1.18 
Peopleinhouse 0.113956  2.32 
Education mother  -0.05083  -1.32 
Education father  0.001631  0.05 
Constant -0.95792  -1.14 
    
N. of observations  176   
LR χ
2 (9)  25.43   
Prob > χ
2      0.002   
Log likelihood   -109.86812          
Pseudo R
2         0.0707    
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Appendix – not to be published 
Table A1. Summary Statistics of Socio-Demographic and Economic 
Variables 
              
Variable  O Mean Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
        
Male 0.84  0.37  0  1 
Age 49.74  12.70  24  88 
Education 9.92  4.19  0  22 
Education mother  4.56  4.01  0  16 
Education father  4.66  4.27  0  18 
Married 0.65  0.48  0  1 
Single 0.20  0.40  0  1 
Living together  0.09  0.28  0  1 
Divorced 0.01  0.09  0  1 
Separated 0.03  0.16  0  1 
Widowed 0.03  0.18  0  1 
People in house  3.97  1.82  1  12 
Children 2.50  1.89  0  11 
Hectars 9.60  22.82  0  160 
House 0.87  0.34  0  1 
Honey 0.61  0.49  0  1 
Other bees  0.01  0.11  0  1 
Agriculture 0.13  0.34  0  1 
Breeding 0.06  0.25  0  1 
Other activity  0.20  0.40  0  1 
Hours total  42.26  17.54  2  105 
Hours honey  18.33  14.28  0  70 
Hours agriculture  7.55  13.45  0  60 
Hours breeding  3.94  10.59  0  70 
Hours other  9.93  17.34  0  89 
Income necessary  4,784,549  3,605,721  480,000  36,000,000 
Income total  4,988,680  11,400,000  0  110,000,000 
Income honey  2,109,031  3,878,463  0  40,000,000 
Income bees  346,100  1,016,250  0  10,000,000 
Income agriculture  967,496  7,125,316  0  100,000,000 
Income breeding  247,122  841,495  0  9,000,000 
Income other  1,350,009  6,009,740  0  80,000,000 
Other sources  0.61  0.49  0  1 
Sale Apicoop  50.70  44.14  0  100 
Sale retail  31.61  40.09  0  100 
Sale local intermediaries  5.53  21.23  0  100 
Sale traditional intermediaries  8.06  25.68  0  100 
Sale to international intermediaries  0.86  8.18  0  92 
Price Apicoop  767  51  600  950 
Price retail  1,536  393  800  2,500 
Price local intermediaries  904  352  680  2,000 
Price traditional intermediaries  894  260  680  1,600 
Price international intermediaries  1,110  385  730  1,500   36
Price per kilo  1,040  466  0  2,500 
Honey production  3,232  6,134  0  60,000 
Productivity per hour  141,302  280,286  0  3,333 
Advance Payment  0.20  0.40  0  1 
Percentage advance   25.07  19.13  5  100 
Interests on advance  0.61  3.27  0  20 
Training courses  0.29  0.46  0  1 
Loan 0.76  0.43  0  1 
Savings 0.55  0.50  0  1 
Credit restriction  0.17  0.38  0  1 
Wage Permanent worker  821  332  170  1,477 
Wage Temporary worker  935  258  375  1,900 
Happiness 5.55  1.70  3  9 
Family satisfaction  6.89  1.70  3  10 
Town 0.23  0.42  0  1 
Santa Barbara  0.21  0.41  0  1 
Paillaco 0.19  0.40  0  1 
Rancagua 0.11  0.31  0  1 
Mahiue 0.04  0.18  0  1 
Years pre Apicoop  2.58  7.054  0  29 
Flo 0.46  0.50  0  1 
Half Flo  0.12  0.33  0  1 
No Flo  0.42  0.49  0  1 
FT age flo  3.05  4.76  0  20 
FT age half flo  0.47  1.34  0  8 
              
 
 
 